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Session Objective and Outline
To discuss how to strategically update the Human System Risk process to highlight 
and flush out the linkages between risks, contributing factors, and 
countermeasures in a useful way
1. Erik – Overview and Needs
2. Rob – Visualization, DAGs and Networks
3. Q&A
Definitions
Here are some definitions: 
 Risk – the probability (likelihood) and magnitude (consequence) of a loss, 
disaster, or undesirable event
Mathematically this looks like: 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = ∑𝑖𝑖 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖
 Risk Management – the identification, assessment, and prioritization of risks 
followed by coordinated and economical application of resources to minimize, 
monitor, and control the probability and/or impact of unfortunate events
 Human System Risk – a recognized and tracked potential NASA flight-crew 
health or performance risk that has a defined consequence and associated 
likelihood supported by evidence which applies to a particular DRM. 
Other ‘risks’ that the agency holds – programmatic and institutional risks - are 
outside the scope of this discussion. 
A basic fact
No one is satisfied with the way we are handling risks. 
Dissatisfaction with the Risk Approach
 Archiving in Powerpoint is inappropriate. 
 We fail to consider the known and suspected links between risks.
 We have a rudimentary prioritization system.
 We don’t leverage our knowledge as well as we could to improve decisions.
 We don’t leverage software to manage our data and knowledge.
Problems
HSRB has the responsibility to set Human System Risk Posture and recommend 
targets for risk mitigation efforts.
 Problem 1 – We need to inform Risk Posture based on an understanding of the 
effects of and linkages between contributing factors and countermeasures. At 
this time, those are only written out on a set of Powerpoint slides.
 Problem 2 – We need to inform Risk Posture based on operational endpoints.  
When we approach risks in a silo, we often fail to identify ‘how much’ they 
contribute to the operational endpoints of interest.
 Problem 3 – We need to have a transparent and repeatable method to 
prioritize Risks on the basis of DRMs and known or suspected Risk-Risk 
interactions. At this time, we prioritize based on what is red.
Problems (cont’d)
 Problem 4 – We need to succinctly communicate our understanding of the Risk 
Posture crews face.  If we get too granular in our visualization or 
communication, we fail in communicating.
 Problem 5 – We need to improve our decision velocity. We don’t leverage 
software to track, catalog, and inform decisions.
 Problem 6 – Money is always a problem. There has historically been a lack of 
funding for HMTA work
 Problem 7 – We are not writing down what we know.  There is lack of 
organization to leverage critical SME inputs
What can we do?  
There are a number of ways we are trying to improve our systems:
 Updating the HSRB Risk Management Plan – clearly define DRMs, 5x5 Risk Matrix, Levels of Evidence 
guidance, Risk Objectives Hierarchy, Risk Prioritization Principles
 Articulate clear expectations for what is likely to improve risk color
 Asking risk stakeholders to bring forward their deliverables and risk mitigation plans
 Explore Software tools for categorizing, relating, mapping and visualizing risks (Architex)
 Drawing, tracking, and using the links between risks and risk factors that we know or 
think we know?
History
 Risk Management Analysis Tool (RMAT)
Database format to understand Human System 
Risks and compare standards, requirements, 
mitigation strategies, etc. against known mission 
architectures and resources. 
Sample RMAT for EVA Risk (2013)
There have been attempts to set up communication and visual tools and framework 
to understand risk relationships
History (cont’d)
 Master Logic Diagram (MLD)
Visual tool showing hierarchy of 
contributing factors
 Contributing Factor Map (CFM) - HRP
Mindock J, Lumpkins S, Anton W, Havenhill M, Shelhamer M, Canga M. 
Integrating spaceflight human system risk research. Acta Astronautica. 
2017 Oct 1;139:306-12.
History (cont’d)
Visual representation of a taxonomy 
of  terminology of  factors influencing  
human health and performance in 
spaceflight.
We continue to try…
 Identifying the links between risks is an ongoing activity both from 
the bottom up…
 Identifying the links between risks is an ongoing activity from the 
top down…
And try…
Notional only
Not for decision making
Why haven’t these efforts been enough?   
 When they come in one giant pre-formed package people want to know 
if the whole thing is right (how do we validate, the SME’s don’t have 
bandwidth for that?)
 When they come from the bottom up, people want to know why it is 
missing this piece or that piece (throws out useful information because it 
isn’t the whole picture yet)
 Both of these approaches can have too much granularity (the message 
gets lost in the details)
 Are we even asking the right question?
What is the question we are asking?
What are the risks our crews face in a given mission type?
How can we make the mission less risky?
Risk Summary
L x C Driver: OPS Likelihood all DRMs: < 1% likelihood of renal stone formation 
in mission due to existing countermeasures (per IMM 0.37% astronaut population 
incidence rate) and Planetary (per IMM 0.43% incidence). Consequence: all except 
Planetary:  Potential incapacitation, significant impact in performance, possible loss 
of mission objectives due to evacuation of multiple crewmembers. Consequence
LEO, Sortie, Lunar: Significant injury that may affect personal safety (capability of 
return to Earth for treatment). DS Journey & Planetary: Death or permanent 
disabling injury due to inability to provide in-mission and/or return to Earth for 
treatment.  LTH Likelihood All DRMs: Based on post mission occurrence of renal 
stones; (36 renal stone events in 22 crewmembers). LTH Consequence: LEO, 
Sortie, and Lunar: Return to near baseline requires medical intervention with 
known treatments. DS Journey & Planetary: Stone event in mission and inability for 
immediate return for treatment, unknown and improbable return to baseline; 
impacts quality of life.
Risk Title: Risk of Renal Stone Formation
Risk Statement: Given changes in urinary biochemistry during space flight, there is a possibility that symptomatic renal stones may form, resulting in urinary 
calculi or urolithiasis, renal colic (pain), nausea, vomiting, hematuria, infection, hydronephrosis.
Primary Hazard: Altered gravity (µ-gravity - excess calcium excretion, 
low urine volume, urinary supersaturation)
Secondary Hazard: Hostile/closed environment 
(spacecraft design - limited H2O resource)
Countermeasure: 
Prevention: Screening, Crew 
Education, Diet (includes H2O), 
K-Cit/ bisphosphonates, 
exercise 
Treatment:  Return to Earth
Contributing Factors: Increased Urinary Calcium Excretion (bone loss/calcium excretion), Decreased Urine Volume , Increased Urinary 
Supersaturation, Dietary Factors (Decreased fluid intake, Increased Na+ Intake, etc., reference MLD), Mission Duration - Mission Resources, 
Hypercapnia.
State of Knowledge: All DRMs: Concern with post mission occurrence of renal stones; (36 post mission renal stone events). Risk mitigation strategies are well-defined although the 
ability to treat a renal stone during exploration missions is not yet available. Potential use of  in-flight ultrasound for diagnosis and treatment . Identification of Randall’s plaques  as a 
predictor of stone formation represents a new area for research and clinical use. Ground bedrest & immobilization studies indicate that exercise is a good CM to lower urinary Ca++ and 
that exercise also increases sweating providing an alternate route for Ca++ release; therefore, exercise should be counted as a valid/current countermeasure.
Risk Disposition Rationale: OPS/LTH Accepted for LEO, Sortie and 
Lunar as missions may be aborted for treatment on Earth. Requires Mitigation for 
DS Journey and Planetary missions as inflight treatments are not yet available and 
missions cannot be aborted for immediate treatment to Earth. Prevention of event 
through preflight screening and hydration education. Provide adequate in-flight 
resources (water, bone CM) to minimize risk. Define medical requirements to 
diagnose, monitor and treat an in-flight event. 
DRM 
Categories
Mission 
Duration
LxC Risk 
OPS Disposition
LxC Risk 
LTH         Disposition
Low Earth 
Orbit
6 
Months
2 x 3 Accepted 3 x 3 Accepted
1 
Year
2 x 3 Accepted 3 x 3 Accepted
Deep Space 
Sortie
1 
Month
2 x 3 Accepted 3 x 3 Accepted
Lunar Visit/
Habitation
1
Year
2 x 3 Accepted 3 x 3 Accepted
Deep Space 
Journey/Hab
1 
Year
2 x 4 Requires
Mitigation
3 x 4 Requires
Mitigation
Planetary 3 
Years
2 x 4 Requires
Mitigation
3 x 4 Requires
Mitigation
Information
(*) Risk Custodian: R. Pietrzyk
Why do we have these?
Contributing Factor - an operational, design, or human-system 
variable that is likely to worsen Human System Risks. This is 
something that happens.
NOTE – a Human System Risk may be a contributing factor to other Human System Risks.
Countermeasure - any action, hardware/software, or capability 
provided pre-, in-, or post-mission that serves to reduce risk within 
the Risk Impact Categories. These are things we do.
Most of us are just making a laundry list of semi-relevant information 
when we capture these for the Risk Summary Slide
Risk SummaryRisk Title: Risk of Performance Decrement and Crew Illness Due to Inadequate Food and Nutrition
Risk Statement: Given that there is a constrained ability to supply adequate food in spaceflight missions, there is a possibility that inadequate nutrition will result in performance decrement, crew illness, and 
long term health effects. 
Primary Hazard: Distance from earth Secondary Hazard(s): Isolation, 
Radiation
Countermeasure:
Monitoring: dietary intake, track medical conditions and performance metrics
Prevention: validated nutrition requirements and acceptability standards, pre-
packaged balanced/optimized food with stable nutrition, processing and packaging
standards, microbial standard
Intervention: dietary prescription
Contributing Factors: Mission design; changing nutritional requirements over long duration missions; food safety; 
food acceptability; nutritional stability of food; compromised storage, packaging, or handling of food; radiation; immune 
system function during spaceflight; spaceflight microbial environment; vehicle design for food storage/mass/volume.
State of Knowledge: Much is known about the basic nutrition required to maintain performance and health during spaceflight.  Nutrition Stand, 3001, Section 4.2.7 Permissible Outcome Limit.
Standards/controls exist to maintain food safety during spaceflight.  Adequate nutrition and safe food have been demonstrated for 6 month missions and limited 1 year missions that have resupply. Optimizing 
food/nutrient intake will likely benefit multiple systems, will drive nutrient requirement definitions, and food provisions. Providing a five year shelf life for safe pre-packaged food with appropriate nutrition 
content, acceptability, and variety are a challenge. Some CMs being investigated are: Bioregenerative supplementation and alternative processing, packaging, and storage. Potential health impacts include 1) 
reductions in crew performance (loss of endurance, cognition); 2) crew illness (loss of bone and muscle mass, immune function, cardiovascular performance, gastrointestinal function, severe dehydration, nausea, 
diarrhea, endocrine  function, ocular, psychological health, and the ability to mitigate oxidative damage); 3) long term health effects (cancer, bone, cardio, etc.), 4) interactions with other 
systems/countermeasures (e.g., drug/nutrient interactions, environment influences on oxidative stress, exercise-induced alterations in energy reqs.).
L x C Drivers: 
OPS Likelihood
<30 days: <0.1% probability of inadequate nutrition due to short duration of mission. Likelihood All DRMs except <30 days: Likelihood >1%. Although 
adequate nutrition/safe food has been demonstrated in 6m missions, evidence also indicates that 34% of crews lose 5 to 10% of body weight and that 2% 
of the crewmembers lose >10% during those missions. Additionally, due to meal item selection ability, some crew data indicate nutrient content with at 
least one data point out of normal range (pre/in/post). This incidence is compounded for Lunar 30 days to 1 year and Planetary: Due to duration of 
mission, prepositioning, and lack of resupply (instability of food nutrition and acceptability), high likelihood of inadequate nutrition and/or illness. 
OPS Consequence All cases where food is prepositioned beyond best if used by date: Risk of decrements to health and performance due to inadequate 
nutrition. Consequence Planetary, and Lunar: Significant and severe consequence (respectively) of inadequate nutrition and illness due to prepositioning 
and lack of resupply, unpredicted changes in nutritional needs, increased radiation exposure, and BHP. 
LTH Likelihood DRMs with resupply, no prepositioning: Low and medium probability of experiencing vitamin deficiencies post-flight - expected to return 
to baseline within 3 months with limited intervention. Likelihood LEO 1y, Lunar, and Planetary: >1% probability of nutritional deficiencies post-flight from 
these  longer missions lacking food resupply (effects may become evident with unpredicted changes in nutritional needs). Planetary:  High likelihood of 
not meeting standard due to lack of resupply. 
LTH  Consequence DRMs with resupply, no prepositioning : Return to baseline within 3 months. Lunar 30 days to 1 year: Return to baseline within 1y as 
mission conditions (closed food system, unpredicted changes in nutritional needs, radiation, and BHP) may exacerbate post-flight recovery. Planetary: May 
have long term effects (unknown & improbable return to baseline) on multiple systems, especially with no resupply, unpredicted changes in nutritional 
needs, increases in radiation, along with BHP.
Risk Disposition Rationale per DRM: For all missions except Lunar 30 days to 1 year (assuming food is prepositioned, no resupply), and 
Planetary, the risk is accepted but validation of requirements is needed, and optimization of food system is desired.  For Planetary:  Validation of 
requirements is needed, and optimization of food system is needed.  Mitigation is required to provide a food system that can maintain nutritious, safe food 
for five years promotes health within resource restrictions (reduced mass/volume).
Risk Custodian Team: G. Douglas, S. Smith, B. Chamberlain, J. Maners
DRM 
Categories
Mission Type and 
Duration
LxC 
OPS
Risk 
Disposition 
LxC 
LTH
Risk 
Disposition
Low Earth 
Orbit
Short
(<30 days) 3x1
Accepted/
Optimize 2x1 Accepted
Long 
(30 days to 1 year) 3x1
Accepted/
Optimize 3x1 Accepted
Lunar Orbital 
Short 
(<30 days) 3x1
Accepted/
Optimize 3x1
Accepted/
Optimize
Long 
(30 days to 1 year) 3x3 3x2
Lunar Orbital 
+ Surface
Short
(<30 days) 3x1
Accepted/
Optimize 3x1
Accepted/
Optimize
Long 
(30 days to 1 year) 3x3 3x2
Mars
Preparatory (<365 
days) 3x4
Requires 
Mitigation 3x4
Requires 
Mitigation
Planetary (365 
days to 3 years) 3x4
Requires 
Mitigation 3x4
Requires 
Mitigation
Decreased Food Acceptability
(Contributing Factor)
Food and Nutrition Risk
Refrigeration
(Preventive Countermeasure)
Anticholinergic medications
(Contributing Factor)
Urinary Retention 
Risk
Catheterization
(Intervention Countermeasure)
Decreased Hydration Status
(Contributing Factor)
Renal Stone Risk
Decreased Hydration Status
(Contributing Factor)
Renal Stone Risk
Prevention Countermeasure?
Ultrasound
(Monitoring)
MRM Formation
(Contributing Factor)
Water Intake Tracking
(Monitoring)
Seeking Causality
 Directed Acyclic Graphs - DAGs
 Eventually targeting a Bayesian Network
It’s a good time…
…to try something new!
 The organizational structure for Human System Risk is being redefined 
and funded now.
 The maturity of techniques and data management systems and increasing 
complexity of missions demand a new approach.
 Status quo means we keep working in Powerpoint alone and don’t have 
the ability to  link risk information in a meaningful way
What is our target?
 We are going to try to build the network from the ground up with an end goal 
of creating the larger picture of Risk – eventually.
• Use DAGs to link contributing factors and countermeasures to the risk scenarios and 
incorporate into the workflow for risk updates.
• The DAGs produced will be formally approved as part of Risk Updates and used to feed the 
larger network.
 This is not a project. This is a process change.
• Continuously update the network over time based on what we learn
• This is a framework, identifying what we don’t know is GOOD
• We know that we will get it wrong.  Early.  More than once.  That is okay. We will figure it 
out. 
• We will learn and improve the network, and over time create a network with a sufficient 
level of fidelity to improve our risk management.
What’s next after IWS?
 Risk Custodian Teams will be asked to bring a draft DAG for their risk to 
their orientation sessions as their risks stand up (we expect the first few 
to be a mess).
 Additional meetings with Erik and Rob will be scheduled based on the 
maturity of each Risk DAG.
 A slide will be added to any risk update package that includes a final DAG 
for Board approval in the larger package.
 The HSRB Risk Management Office will work from these DAGS to inform 
the larger network.
 Today is all about first steps: We will provide a clear set of deliverables and 
expectations in the Orientation Sessions we have for each risk going forward. 
Do not freak out.
 Walk-through example
 Q&A Time
Turning over to Rob…
HSRB Key Questions
 How do we represent and keep track of all “contributing factor” 
relationships and risk-risk interactions in a way that is accessible and 
comprehendible?
 Given no risk can ever be brought to zero, how will we objectively 
determine which ones to buy-down or accept?
 For any exposure-outcome combination, is it better to try to prevent 
the exposure (preventive countermeasures) or is it better to try to 
reduce the magnitude of the consequence (intervention 
countermeasures)?
 How can we know (and express) our total probability (at a high level) 
of a particular outcome/consequence from all sources?
Graphs
Nodes
Edges
Benefits of graph structure
Independencies: nodes that are independent of one another given graph
Centrality: most “important” or “influential” nodes in a network
Connectivity: measure of network complexity; minimum number of links 
that must be broken to disconnect network components
Connectivity: removing this 
one breaks the clusters apart
High Centrality
Benefits of graph structures
Community detection
• Nodes that are closer to each other than any others - analogous to cluster 
analysis
• Communities can be discrete or overlapping
Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs)
Specific type of graph 
• Directed: single-headed arrows show direction of relationship
• Acyclic: no ‘cycles’ (feedback loops); relationship goes one way and there are no directed 
paths back to a node once we’ve left it 
DAGs are used to represent causality in a network graph format, i.e. a causal 
relationships are the basis for connection between nodes
General network representation DAG
Example DAG: UTI
Novel question: How does use of anticholinergics modify our total probability of death from sepsis after UTI?
Example DAG: Crew Egress Example
This graph implies the following:
• If we fail to account for in-flight exercise (Exercise 
countermeasures), we will get a biased answer;
• If we fail to account for the source of diminished 
physical capability, we will get a biased answer.
How does muscle strength modify the total probability
of Serious Injury and Death upon crew egress from a
water-landing capsule?
Example DAG: Elevated CO2 exposure
Factors that lead up to 
CO2 levels are 
irrelevant once we 
know the CO2 level.

DAG example: Apollo 13
Apollo 13: one possible version
Bayesian Networks
 Bayesian Networks are DAGs combined with joint probability distributions
 Allows for straight-forward computation of probability of events under “what-if” 
scenarios
DAG Bayesian Network
HSRB Key Questions
How do we represent and keep track of all “contributing 
factor” relationships and risk-risk interactions in a way 
that is accessible and comprehendible?
Nodes & edges in DAG;
Implied structural independencies;
Communities/clustering
Given no risk can ever be brought to zero, how will we 
objectively determine which ones to buy-down or accept?
Centrality measures;
Changes in Connectivity with mitigation;
Changes in total probabilities by outcome
For any exposure-outcome combination, is it better to try 
to prevent the exposure (preventive countermeasures) or 
is it better to try to reduce the magnitude of the 
consequence (intervention countermeasures)?
Compare P(exposure) vs. P(outcome|exposure)
How can we know (and express) our total probability (at a 
high level) of a particular outcome/consequence from all 
sources?
Bayesian Network
Question Potential Strategy
What this process provides
Early on:
A common view of our risks that we can all work off of together to generate hypotheses and 
break down silos
Network metrics that allow us to prioritize exposures and outcomes as targets for research
As the network matures:
A way to find the best mitigation strategy for a given risk based on the probabilities of exposure 
and outcome
Ability to quantify total probability in outcome categories (e.g. “total probability of loss of crew on 
a Mars exploration mission”)
Always:
Good understanding of the gaps in our knowledge
What this process cannot provide
1. An immediate answer to all our unknowns
2. The “Right” answer in the face of uncertain data
3. Value judgments about acceptable levels of probability for various 
outcomes
4. A replacement for the expert judgement of the risk custodial teams 
and element scientists. Instead, this is designed to capture and 
represent all expert knowledge, and make it accessible to all
Visualizing complex networks
Complex network maps are best represented in 3 dimensions
Visualizing them in 3D is best done in a VR environment
We are working on a 3D network map visualization in VR: VIDRA 
(Virtual Reality / Data Science Risk Assessment & Analysis)
A live demo of this project is here today – feel free try it out!
Backup Slides
FAQ
 I already have a good understanding of my risk and what needs to be done with it. Why do I need to do this?
This effort will (1) enable new ways to measure risk importance; (2) make it far easier to understand contributing factors, risk-risk interactions 
and countermeasures; and (3) make it easier to communicate risk to other risk custodial groups, programs, and the Agency in general.
 My DAG will be very complex. How do I know I’ve got it right?
We will most likely not get it “right.” The value of attempting to represent the cause-effect network is that it will help us think clearly about 
relationships between exposures and outcomes. This will in turn give us hypotheses to test, which will allow us to continually refine the 
network.
 We’ll never have all the data we need to find all the probabilities for a Bayesian Network. How can we use it without that?
Depending on the independencies inherent in the network structure and the things we’re willing to assume, we may not need all the data for 
all of our queries to the network.
 How is this different than MEDPRAT?
MEDPRAT is a general, complex simulation tool that uses Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods. Our network will be a tool for 
understanding risk interplay, and MEDPRAT may in fact help inform some risk estimates in our network, and our network may feed MEDPRAT 
exposure-outcome links.
 Am I expected to know how to draw a DAG correctly on my own?
Drawing DAGs is surprisingly easy. However, the Epidemiologists, Biostatisticians, and the HHPD Data Scientist will be available to support 
groups in drawing their initial DAG. Epidemiologists are trained in DAG interpretation, construction, and independency analysis, and will 
provide ongoing support.
FAQ
Is there a way to use data to demonstrate the truth of a DAG?
No, we can never prove that a DAG is true. However, there are ways to 
use data to demonstrate that parts of a DAG are false.
I think my risk has factors that could have double-headed arrows. 
How do we represent that if arrows are unidirectional?
Events that happen simultaneously cannot be each others’ causes, so 
one or the other must always come first. To represent this in a DAG we 
need to explicitly add in time frames, and there are various 
straightforward methods to do that.
